Author: Afghanistan Security Watch

Disputes among Afghanistan’s political factions and their temporary fragile alliances, have a long history. Over the past half-century, political groups—whether leftist or rightist, ideological or non-ideological—have found numerous excuses for divergence and internal conflict. The outcomes of these disputes have often included the erosion of political forces, the isolation of supporters, and, ultimately, bloody upheavals and tragedies in this country.

This piece examines the internal conflicts of the Taliban, a significant para-military and radical force in Afghanistan, highlighting its contemporary relevance and significance. The Taliban’s internal rifts have a lengthy background, and at present, the organization is experiencing unparalleled internal strife. While it remains uncertain when these conflicts might culminate, the desires and goals of top Taliban officials have transformed into disappointment and hopelessness due to severe internal schisms.
The Taliban has been fragmented into seven factions, each referred to as a “front” or “military command.” On a broader scale, the Kandahar faction, representing the Durrani and Hotak tribes in the southwestern and western provinces, and the Haqqani Network, representing the Ghilzai tribes in the southern and eastern regions, form the main axes of power and the primary sources of internal divisions within the Taliban. (Rashid, 2010)

The Phases of the Taliban’s Internal Conflicts

The internal disputes among the Taliban can be divided into three temporal phases:

1. The era of Mullah Omar.
2. The era of Akhtar Mohammad Mansour.
3. The era of Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, both before and after the Taliban’s return to the power in Afghanistan.

Phase 1: The Era of Mullah Omar

During this period, Mullah Mohammad Omar, a Kandahar native and a member of the jihadist organization “Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami” under Maulvi Mohammad Nabi during the Soviet invasion, emerged as the founder and first leader of the Taliban (Rashid, 2010). Jalaluddin Haqqani, a resident of Paktia and a commander in the Islamic Party under Maulvi Yunus Khalis during the jihad, also played a key role. (Coll, 2018) However, faced mistrust due to:

1. Alleged ties to the CIA.
2. Senior membership in the Mujahideen government, against which the Taliban had rebelled.
3. The lack of tribal affiliation with the Kandahari faction led to him never being accepted as a core Taliban member. This is because the Kandahari faction had become disillusioned and frustrated with the failure of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Islamic Party, to overthrow the government led by Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Although Jalaluddin Haqqani held the position of Minister of Tribal Affairs in the first Taliban regime, he spent most of his time in the eastern provinces and had a lesser role in the war against the United Front of Afghanistan, led by the Ahmad Shah Massoud, his former friend. At that time, most of the fighting was led by the Kandahari Taliban. After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the regime’s leaders, including Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, went to Pakistan and remained there until their deaths.

During the years 2001 to 2015, Mullah Omar established the Quetta and Peshawar Shuras (Rashid, 2010). The Quetta Shura was led by him, and the Peshawar Military Commission created a headquarters for non-Haqqani Ghilzai factions and several non-Pashtun members of the Taliban. Meanwhile, Jalaluddin Haqqani founded the TAL shura. During the 20 years of war between the Taliban and the Afghan government, as well as NATO and coalition forces, the Taliban councils operated independently with separate structures and organizations until the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death in 2015, although their attacks were claimed by a spokesperson (BBC News, 2015).

Phase 2: The Era of Akhtar Mohammad Mansour

Throughout this time, internal differences within the Taliban became increasingly evident, and the Haqqani network emerged as a significant faction, challenging the Kandahari Taliban in an unprecedented manner. By this time, both Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani had passed away, leading to a shift in key leadership roles, with their sons and supporters rising to prominence.

Following Mullah Omar’s death and the subsequent leadership of Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the pre-existing divisions within the Taliban were brought to the forefront. While members of the Quetta Shura leadership council did not entirely agree on Mansour’s leadership, Sirajuddin Haqqani believed himself to be a suitable candidate for leadership. (Giustozzi, 2018). However, the Durani Taliban and the Kandahar faction rejected him for four reasons:

1. He was not a founding member of the Taliban and was non-Durani, which is not approved by the Quetta Shura;
2. He is being pursued by the U.S. and faces a $10 million bounty for his elimination;
3. He is young, not deserving of leadership, and lacks political awareness;
4. Although the main management of the Taliban’s war against Afghanistan was handled by a designated team from Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, the Kandahari faction claimed that Sirajuddin Haqqani was more responsive to the orders of that organization than to the leadership of the Quetta Shura.

At this time, the Taliban leadership council changed its organizational structure, based on which Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, with the support of Iran, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan, was placed in the position of leader and successor to Mullah Omar. As the Pakistanis, in order to prevent the internal collapse of the Taliban due to existing differences, agreed to the appointment of Mullah Akhtar Mansour as the leader of the Taliban. At the same time, Mullah Baradar was imprisoned by the Pakistanis. This situation led the Taliban to attempt to reduce their dependency on Pakistan’s military intelligence organization. To achieve this, they sought to strengthen their relations with Iran. The presence of al-Qaeda leaders in Iran further facilitated the close relationship between Akhtar Mohammad Mansour and the Iranians.

Certain elements within the Iranian regime, who collaborated with drug trafficking networks, allegedly formed a triangle of cooperation with al-Qaeda and Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. Furthermore, the close ties between Iran’s and Russia’s intelligence organizations resulted in Akhtar Mohammad Mansour being introduced to Russian intelligence through his Iranian contacts. These multifaceted relationships created external pressures for Akhtar Mohammad Mansour’s selection as the Taliban leader among other candidates.

Despite the fact that members of the Quetta Shura did not fully agree with Mansour’s selection as leader, Gul Agha Ishakzai, also known as Hedayat Badri, the head of the Quetta Shura’s financial commission, played a key role in securing support from commanders, which ultimately led to Mansour’s appointment as leader. Ultimately, these same relationships and pressures contributed to his targeting and assassination while returning from Iran to Pakistan. It is also worth noting that published documents later revealed that Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, under the alias Mohammad Wali, frequently traveled to the United Arab Emirates. At this time, Sirajuddin Haqqani was appointed for the first time as the first deputy, with authority over appointments and operations in 22 provinces across the south, east, north, and northeast. He also integrated the Peshawar Military Commission with the TAL or Miram Shah Shura. At the same time, Mullah Yaqub Mujahid was appointed as the second deputy, responsible for appointments and leadership of operations in 12 provinces in the southwest, west, and northwest.  (United Nations Security Council, 2023).

With the death of Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, Sirajuddin Haqqani’s efforts once again came to no avail. However, due to the intervention of the ISI and the need for unity on the battlefield and negotiations for the signing of the Doha agreement between the Taliban and the U.S., the internal disagreements did not become prominent or public. Nevertheless, the issue remained as a latent grievance between the Haqqani faction and the Kandahari faction, like a fire beneath the ashes (Rashid, 2010)

Phase 3: The Era of Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada

The internal conflict within the Taliban under Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada can be categorized into two distinct yet interconnected era times: the struggle for power among various factions within the organization and the subsequent challenges of governance following their control of Afghanistan.

During the first one, various factions, including the Haqqani network, political leaders, and military commanders, vied for influence and authority, often leading to intense rivalries and disagreements over strategy and ideology. This internal strife was exacerbated by differing views on how to engage with the international community and the handling of domestic policies.

Second, after the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in August 2021, the focus shifted to the complexities of governance. This involved addressing humanitarian crises, implementing strict interpretations of Islamic law, and managing relations with foreign nations. The Taliban faced significant challenges in establishing a functional government amidst economic turmoil, resistance from fragmented opposition groups, and international scrutiny, all while trying to maintain cohesion within their ranks.

Past inevitabilities transformed into new opportunities. Although, starting in 2016, the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network had jointly selected Kabul as a target for operations, it was the Haqqani network that ultimately captured Kabul after the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, taking control of the Presidential Palace. This gave them a significant, though short-lived, advantage within the Taliban. However, a few days later, the Kandahari Taliban regained control of the Presidential Palace from the Haqqani network, and the luxurious palaces were subsequently divided among the Kandahari Taliban commanders. The dispute over the division of resources and palaces led to a physical confrontation between Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani. Sources indicate that Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani struck Mullah Baradar in the face, and this grievance remained unresolved. Since that time, members of the Haqqani network have faced continued challenges, driven by the Kandahari Taliban’s desire for dominance and superiority. (Moore, 2024; Jamestown Foundation, n.d.; United Nations Security Council, 2023).

For the first two years, the Taliban leader tolerated the challenges posed by Sirajuddin Haqqani, Khalil Haqqani, and the entire Haqqani network. The Kandahari faction repeatedly asked the Haqqani network to participate in the battles in Panjshir, Andarab, and Badakhshan, but Sirajuddin Haqqani rejected these requests.

Members of the Kandahari faction believe that the Haqqani network claims to bear the brunt of the fighting against their opponents, yet they try to avoid this responsibility and instead attempt to place the historical blame for human rights violations in the northern provinces on the shoulders of the Kandahari Taliban faction. (Giustozzi, 2018; United Nations Security Council, 2023).

In the first two years, the Taliban leader did not possess a special force of 40,000 troops and had not solidified his position within the provincial councils under the title of the Ulama Provincial Council. He had not yet appointed key individuals such as Sadr Ibrahim, the senior deputy of the Ministry of the Interior, Mullah Fazel Mazloom, Mullah Sherin, Qayum Zakir, deputies of the Ministry of Defense, and Bismillah, the deputy head of the Taliban intelligence agency, as well as the relevant governors. A consequence of Akhundzada’s leadership weakness was his silence in the face of the assassination and physical elimination of his loyal supporters by the Haqqani network. Sources indicate that the killings of Dawood Muzamil, the former governor of Balkh, the deputy governor, and the police chief of Badakhshan were results of internal conflicts between the Kandahari faction and the Haqqani network.

In the third year of the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan, Akhundzada, the leader of the Taliban, took significant actions to limit the Haqqani network’s power. He issued at least three key orders that were perceived as direct actions against Sirajuddin Haqqani. These measures included the removal and appointment of individuals by the ministers of Defense, Interior, and Intelligence, the allocation of a special budget and distribution of funds, and the prohibition of the distribution of weapons and ammunition by the mentioned ministries. These steps effectively restricted and curtailed the Haqqani network’s manoeuvrability and influence (United Nations Security Council, 2023).

1. The leader of the Taliban, alongside Sirajuddin Haqqani, appointed Sadr Ibrahim from the Kandahar region, a figure close to Iran, as the senior deputy of the Ministry of the Interior and significantly limited his powers. Moreover, authority was given to Sadr, and he began receiving direct orders from Kandahar. Haji Mali Khan, who is Sirajuddin Haqqani’s uncle, serves as the deputy head of the Taliban’s Ministry of Defense and holds a symbolic role.
2. For the position of head of the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), the Taliban appointed Mullah Bismillah, a deputy from Kandahar, with instructions to carry out any task directed by Kandahar. In terms of appointments, dismissals, and other decisions, everything was to proceed according to Kandahar’s orders. This arrangement became a significant daily challenge for GDI Director General Abdul Haq Wasiq and his operational deputy, Tajmir Jawad. Wasiq, in particular, expressed his concerns to Kandahar, but his complaints were disregarded, and no attention was given to his grievances.
3. On the other hand, any important economic position held by Sirajuddin Haqqani’s allies would be reassigned. For instance, Shahabuddin Delawar, a close associate of Sirajuddin Haqqani, was removed from the Ministry of Mines, and Mullah Gul Agha, also known as Hedayatullah Badri, was appointed in his place. Gul Agha, another figure aligned with Iran, was tasked with carrying out any duties or contracts assigned to him by Kandahar.

In general, all authority lies in the hands of Mullah Hebatullah. Other Kandahari groups, such as Mullah Baradar, Mullah Yaqub, and other teams from the Kandahar region, do not confront Haibatullah directly, even though there are disagreements among them.

The leader of the Taliban, along with the Kandahari Taliban and the Haqqani network, has faced serious competition in areas such as power-sharing, the monopolization of power by the Taliban leader and his close team, the collection of taxes from areas under the influence of the Haqqani network, fighting armed opposition groups like the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, and the Afghanistan Freedom Front, managing foreign terrorist groups (more than 20 active and inactive groups, including Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), competing for relations with foreign countries, and vying for revenue-generating departments like ports, municipalities, customs, and mines (Giustozzi, 2018; United Nations Security Council, 2023).

Sirajuddin Haqqani has consistently criticized the actions of the Taliban leader, often indirectly and implicitly, and has seemingly shown opposition to the leader’s decisions regarding women’s work and girls’ education. However, according to reliable intelligence sources, the situation is the opposite. These sources believe that there is no difference between the extremist views of the Taliban leader and the interior minister of the group regarding the prohibition of women’s work, girls’ education, and the enforcement of the law of Amr bil Ma’ruf wa Nahi an al-Munkar (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice), as well as the suppression of part of the leadership and rogue elements of ISIS-Khorasan. (United Nations Security Council, 2023; Moore, 2024).

• Khalil Haqqani: A Victim of Taliban Infighting

Khalil Haqqani, the former Minister of Refugees of the group and the uncle of Sirajuddin Haqqani, was killed on December 11, 2024, and ISIS-Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack. While credible sources do not deny the widespread influence of ISKP within the ranks of the Taliban regime, the individual responsible for this incident appears to be a person named Mufti Abdul Qudoos, a resident of Paghman district and a former active member of the financial division of ISKP. After the Taliban came to power, he briefly served as the head of the ninth district in Kabul’s municipality but was removed from this position for unknown reasons. However, operating under the guise of owning a law office in Kabul, he continued his activities in favor of ISKP. He reportedly used the Taliban Prime Minister’s office to frequently visit the presidential palace, which is under the control of the Kandahari Taliban.

In recent months, he has claimed that some of his friends were imprisoned by the Taliban on charges of being members of ISKP, and he sought to resolve some issues related to their release by visiting Khalil Rahman Haqqani for a potential pardon and reduction of their punishment. This individual apparently examined and identified the weaknesses of the Haqqani network’s ministry and office, then shared this information with an individual named Gul Mohammad, a suicide bomber, about whom further details are unavailable, and facilitated his transfer to the Ministry of Refugees. Taliban have arrested dozens of individuals on these charges, with the greatest suspicion falling on Haji Amanullah, a resident of Shigal, Kunar province. Haji Amanullah, a former commander of Hizb-e-Islami and later a member of ISKP, had gained influence within the Taliban and was appointed as the head of the Refugee Affairs Department in Parwan province.

Nevertheless, the leader of the Taliban has consistently been unwilling to hand over positions controlled by the Kandahari faction to the Haqqani network. In the latest case, he removed and demoted Mullah Abdul Kabir, the political deputy of the Taliban Prime Minister’s office and a close figure to Pakistan. The Taliban leader replaced him with Khalil Haqqani as the Minister of Refugees, a move that illustrates how the leader has pitted the people of one province against another. Ultimately, the Taliban leader will not hesitate to take any action that weakens the Haqqani network and strengthens his own powerful position, demonstrating that he is driven by pragmatic political goals without regard to moral considerations.

At this stage, the leader of the Taliban did not limit his actions against the Haqqani network; instead, his security team, now in powerful positions within the regime, has been involved in purging and seeking revenge on the Haqqani network. As a result, Haibatullah, along with his security team, primarily consisting of deputies from the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Intelligence, has taken significant steps to consolidate power and prevent further instability.

1. The Taliban leader has deployed his elite forces, known as “Yarmouk,” to key locations in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, positioning them at airports and the Presidential Palace to thwart any potential coup attempt by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Minister of Interior, and Mullah Yaqub, the Minister of Defense.
2. Furthermore, in recent days, several shifts in forces have occurred in Kabul and surrounding areas, including Char Asiab, Deh Sabz, Logar, and the Ghorband Valley in Parwan province, with particular attention to regions under the influence of the Haqqani network.

This strategic repositioning reflects the ongoing internal struggles within the Taliban, as the leadership continues to navigate both internal and external challenges to its authority.

Consequences of Internal Conflicts

A high-ranking member of the Taliban, who requested to remain anonymous, asserts that the conflict and divisions between the Kandahari faction and the Haqqani network have escalated to an operational phase. This situation is expected to lead to significant internal tensions, purges, and potentially physical eliminations in the future. Notably, it is during this period that the Taliban leader is most concerned about one individual: Sirajuddin Haqqani. Furthermore, it is widely believed that Sirajuddin Haqqani may emerge as the only viable challenger to the leadership of Haibatullah Akhundzada, assuming he remains alive. According to sources from Afghanistan Security Watch, alongside Sirajuddin Haqqani, various factions, including splinter groups from the Kandahari faction led by Mullah Rasoul, and tribal leaders from the Achakzai clan, are mobilizing with the aim of avenging General Razeq’s death. Simultaneously, traditional northern and eastern Taliban factions are aligning with Sirajuddin, with these groups uniting out of necessity and shared interests to oppose the Kandahari faction.

However, the factional divisions within the Taliban regime are also becoming clearer. In the new political phase, with the lobbying of Pakistan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, some elements in the Western countries are increasingly focusing on supporting Sirajuddin Haqqani as a potentially reformable figure within the Taliban regime, akin to the role of al-Julani in Syria. Meanwhile, the Kandahari faction, with the support of Iran, Russia, and China, will line up in opposition to one another.

The lingering question remains: in the event of a confrontation between factions within the Taliban regime, how will foreign groups stationed in Afghanistan respond? Some analysts argue that, under any circumstances, the Taliban will not sever its ties with foreign groups, as each faction within the regime relies on these groups for leverage, drawing support both from the East and the West. On the other hand, if the Haqqani faction engages in an open power struggle with the Taliban leader, foreign actors may initially attempt to mediate the crisis. However, in the long term, they will likely wait before ultimately aligning with the victorious faction. In a more extreme scenario, some foreign groups, disillusioned by the infighting between the factions, may eventually abandon both sides and join the ranks of ISKP, a development that ISKP is closely monitoring and eagerly anticipating.

Regarding the instrumental use of the Taliban leadership, it is believed that the world will not tolerate it, and it is also thought that this group will become increasingly isolated in the future. If this isolation and marginalization intensify, the Taliban’s strength will lie in the foreign terrorist groups that pose a threat to the world. For this reason, the Taliban will never take action against members of foreign groups, from al-Qaeda to TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), Jish al-Adl, and Central Asian groups, under any circumstances (Financial Times, 2024).

To manage the foreign groups operating within Afghanistan, the Taliban has established a specialized department within its General Intelligence Directorate, designated under code 030. This department is led by Qari Isaaq, a senior member of al-Qaeda from Kunduz province, who has maintained close ties with prominent figures such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and numerous other top al-Qaeda officials. Through this department, all foreign group members are funded, organized, and overseen, ensuring the Taliban’s control over their activities and maintaining strategic leverage.

In summary, the internal conflicts and confrontations within the Taliban are likely to result in significant changes to their leadership and political structure, potentially exacerbating intra-tribal and factional rivalries. These divisions could, in turn, enhance the operational maneuvering capacity of armed opposition groups, including ISKP, thereby intensifying the overall instability in the region.

References

• – Coll, S. (2018). Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Penguin Press.
• – BBC News. (2015, July 29). Taliban leader Mullah Omar ‘is dead’. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33703097
• – Giustozzi, A. (2018). The Taliban at War: 2001–2018. Oxford University Press.
• – Rashid, A. (2010). Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press.
• – Associated Press. (n.d.). Reclusive Taliban leader warns Afghans against earning money or gaining ‘worldly honor’. AP News. Retrieved January 13, 2025, from https://apnews.com/article/812d08d9fe70257818b8d31fa7d9eccf
• – Jamestown Foundation. (n.d.). The Haqqani-Akhundzada rift: Could civil war break out in the Taliban’s ranks? The Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved January 13, 2025, from https://jamestown.org/program/the-haqqani-akhundzada-rift-could-civil-war-break-out-in-the-talibans-ranks/
• – Moore, M. (2024, August 18). How Biden allowed the Taliban to return to rule -Afghanistan. New York Post. Retrieved January 13, 2025, from https://nypost.com/2024/08/18/world-news/how-biden-allowed-the-taliban-to-return-to-rule-afghanistan/
• – United Nations Security Council. (2023). Report on Afghanistan under Taliban rule: Governance and inclusion concerns. Retrieved January 13, 2025, from https://documents.un.org/access.nsf/get?DS=S%2F2023%2F370&Lang=E&OpenAgent
• – United Nations Security Council. (2023). Thirteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities (S/2023/370). Retrieved January 13, 2025, from https://documents.un.org/access.nsf/get?DS=S%2F2023%2F370&Lang=E&OpenAgent
• – Financial Times. (2024). Taliban’s inaction against TTP fuels regional instability. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/85935c21-6973-4956-af5e-282aacd05294